General procedures leading to correlated equilibria

DOI10.1007/S001820400182zbMath1133.91316OpenAlexW1987714890MaRDI QIDQ1764278

Amotz Cahn

Publication date: 24 February 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400182

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumfictitious playregret-matchingadaptive heuristicsadaptive procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (3)

Regret minimization, willingness-to-accept-losses and framing ⋮ Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player ⋮ How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures

This page was built for publication: General procedures leading to correlated equilibria