On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
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Publication:1764287
DOI10.1007/s001820400189zbMath1093.91047OpenAlexW2117808195MaRDI QIDQ1764287
Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Alejdanro Neme, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 24 February 2005
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143633
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