Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
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Publication:1764793
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00076-4zbMath1101.91319OpenAlexW2148030170MaRDI QIDQ1764793
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(03)00076-4
Individual preferences (91B08) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (3)
Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing
Cites Work
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