The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1766945
DOI10.1007/S00712-004-0085-7zbMath1100.91527OpenAlexW2047382498MaRDI QIDQ1766945
Publication date: 3 March 2005
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/7706
Related Items (8)
Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology ⋮ Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options ⋮ Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships ⋮ Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents ⋮ An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
This page was built for publication: The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
