Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior

DOI10.1007/s001820400170zbMath1101.91004OpenAlexW3121455084MaRDI QIDQ1767470

Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date: 11 March 2005

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22832

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilitylattice theoryprice-taking behaviorImitationaggregate-taking strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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