Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers

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Publication:1768404

DOI10.1007/s11238-004-2646-1zbMath1090.91009OpenAlexW2031523907MaRDI QIDQ1768404

Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 15 March 2005

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-2646-1




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