Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
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Publication:1769600
DOI10.2977/prims/1145475501zbMath1069.90079OpenAlexW2065591019MaRDI QIDQ1769600
Publication date: 4 April 2005
Published in: Publications of the Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Kyoto University (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2977/prims/1145475501
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