\(k\)-price auctions: revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0424-XzbMath1100.91035OpenAlexW2017572518MaRDI QIDQ1770136

Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date: 9 April 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x

zbMATH Keywords

risk seekinginternet auctionsrisk averse agentscompetition in auction designfun seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Mediators in position auctions ⋮ A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed ⋮ Competing first-price and second-price auctions ⋮ IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION IN A THIRD-PRICE AUCTION MODEL ⋮ Competing auctions with endogenous quantities ⋮ Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

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