Electoral competition under imperfect information

DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0414-zzbMath1100.91018OpenAlexW2016316597MaRDI QIDQ1770145

Karine van der Straeten, Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 9 April 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0414-z

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementvotingElectoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games ⋮ RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION ⋮ Information and targeted spending

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