Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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Publication:1772667
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006zbMath1098.91092OpenAlexW2099790472MaRDI QIDQ1772667
Publication date: 21 April 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006
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