Rationality and bounded information in repeated games, with application to the iterated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2004.08.003zbMath1118.91019OpenAlexW2114089317MaRDI QIDQ1775816

Niranjan Chakravarthy

Publication date: 4 May 2005

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2004.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

InformationPrisoner's dilemmaBounded rationalityCooperationCompetitive Markov decision processSubgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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