On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly

DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0441-9zbMath1107.91006OpenAlexW3125111876MaRDI QIDQ1779013

Giovanna Iannantuoni, Francesco De Sinopoli

Publication date: 20 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/280

zbMATH Keywords

regular equilibriaPlurality rulestable sets.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

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