Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts
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Publication:1779719
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2004.08.001zbMath1118.91033OpenAlexW2075206448MaRDI QIDQ1779719
Publication date: 1 June 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.08.001
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Cites Work
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