Bargaining power in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2004.07.001zbMath1118.91020OpenAlexW1970629238MaRDI QIDQ1779723

Lars Peter Østerdal

Publication date: 1 June 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesrenegotiationselection-consistent perfect equilibriumsubgame perfect equilibrium concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
• Starting small and commitment
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Starting small and renegotiation
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

This page was built for publication: Bargaining power in repeated games