Testing threats in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.003zbMath1118.91021OpenAlexW1963883220MaRDI QIDQ1779815

Ran Spiegler

Publication date: 1 June 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391749000000000445.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityinfinitely repeated gamessolution conceptsjustifiabilitytrigger strategiesNash Equilibrium with Tests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

An axiomatization of plays in repeated games ⋮ Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium

Cites Work

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• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with perturbations
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games