Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.04.009zbMath1118.91016OpenAlexW2150921855MaRDI QIDQ1779817

Martin W. Cripps, Eddie Dekel, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Publication date: 1 June 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (11)

Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns ⋮ Reputation and exogenous private learning ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

Cites Work

• Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Bargaining, Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts
• Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information

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