Strategy-proof risk sharing
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Publication:1779831
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.004zbMath1118.91056OpenAlexW1969049152MaRDI QIDQ1779831
Publication date: 1 June 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.004
Related Items (2)
On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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