Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence
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Publication:1779833
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.006zbMath1118.91010OpenAlexW2102117952MaRDI QIDQ1779833
Publication date: 1 June 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1158/1/es-64.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (4)
Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games ⋮ A cooperative game with envy ⋮ How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication ⋮ Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
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