The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0460-6zbMath1114.91020OpenAlexW2745291807MaRDI QIDQ1780164

Mogens Jense, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Brigitte Sloth

Publication date: 7 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1340.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamesEvolutionChickenConventionsStatic games of incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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