Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets

DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0494-4zbMath1114.91016OpenAlexW2070466565MaRDI QIDQ1780165

Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 7 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2003/stable_partitions.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Feasible setsIncreasing and decreasing returnsPositive externalityStable partitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

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