Oligopolistic markets with leadership and demand functions possibly discontinuous

DOI10.1007/S10957-004-1856-6zbMath1118.91045OpenAlexW2005685319MaRDI QIDQ1780595

Lina Mallozzi, Jacqueline Morgan

Publication date: 13 June 2005

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-004-1856-6

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg problemsocial Nash equilibrium.weighted reaction set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Entropic regularization in hierarchical games ⋮ Multi-leader multi-follower model with aggregative uncertainty ⋮ Softening bilevel problems via two-scale Gibbs measures ⋮ Existence of Solutions for Deterministic Bilevel Games under a General Bayesian Approach ⋮ Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm ⋮ Regularization and Approximation Methods in Stackelberg Games and Bilevel Optimization ⋮ Oligopolistic markets with leadership, cooperative followers and a multivalued inverse demand function

Cites Work

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• Potential games
• A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations
• Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*

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