An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets

DOI10.1016/j.jeem.2004.03.004zbMath1087.91517OpenAlexW2050467640MaRDI QIDQ1780810

Emilson C. D. Silva, Arthur J. Caplan

Publication date: 13 June 2005

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1255&context=eri

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto efficiencyCorrelated externalityJoint emissions permit markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (3)

Temporal flexibility of permit trading when pollutants are correlated ⋮ Double-dipping in environmental markets ⋮ Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding

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