An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
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Publication:1780914
DOI10.1007/s00199-004-0533-1zbMath1097.91033OpenAlexW1990908416MaRDI QIDQ1780914
Publication date: 14 June 2005
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0533-1
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