Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014zbMath1396.91358OpenAlexW3121952793MaRDI QIDQ1782287

Pierre Chaigneau, Nicolas Sahuguet, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelprudencerisk aversionexecutive compensation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Environmental auditing in management systems and public policy
• Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion
• Wealth effects in the principal agent model
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• Exploring Higher Order Risk Effects
• Standard Risk Aversion

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