Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012zbMath1396.91238OpenAlexW2604951231MaRDI QIDQ1782333

Christian Ewerhart

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdiscriminationTullock contestheterogeneous valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (15)

Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations ⋮ Discriminatory power and pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the lottery blotto game ⋮ Complete rent dissipation in contest with power technologies ⋮ Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ Optimal tie-breaking rules ⋮ On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Complete-rent-dissipation contest design ⋮ Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes ⋮ The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests ⋮ Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power ⋮ Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: uniqueness and characterization ⋮ Dynamic contest model with bounded rationality ⋮ Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes ⋮ Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players ⋮ Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Accuracy in contests: players' perspective
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests

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