Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.06.027zbMath1396.91400OpenAlexW2719036303MaRDI QIDQ1782351

Min Zhang, Francesco Palazzo

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/16758

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosureasymmetric learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
• Information revelation in auctions
• On the convergence of informational cascades
• Information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings: The one sided information case
• Slow boom, sudden crash
• A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
• Bayesian Learning in Social Networks
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• On Cumulative Sums of Random Variables

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