Replicator dynamics and evolutionary game of social tolerance: the role of neutral agents

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.005zbMath1398.91081OpenAlexW2735229779MaRDI QIDQ1782376

Daiyan Peng, Yingying Shi, Min Pan

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

tolerancereplicator dynamicseconomic interaction model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• Economic interactions and social tolerance: a dynamic perspective