Self-organizing teams

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.08.012zbMath1401.90106OpenAlexW2748031069MaRDI QIDQ1782426

Matthias Kräkel

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardmismatchlimited liabilityabuse of authority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (1)

Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership

Cites Work

• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*

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