First-price auction implements efficient investments

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.08.013zbMath1396.91281OpenAlexW2745847872MaRDI QIDQ1782427

Kentaro Tomoeda

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/116930

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctioninvestment efficiencyfull implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ First-price auction implements efficient investments

Cites Work

• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• First-price auction implements efficient investments
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

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