Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.08.014zbMath1395.91224OpenAlexW2613175796MaRDI QIDQ1782433

Anna Dodonova

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.014

zbMATH Keywords

auctionacquisitiontakeoverjump biddingpreemptive bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices

Cites Work

• Toeholds and signalling in takeover auctions
• Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests
• Costly Signalling in Auctions

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