Memory does not necessarily promote cooperation in dilemma games

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2013.10.014zbMath1402.91066OpenAlexW1964767788MaRDI QIDQ1782552

Tao Wang, Deng Li, Xiaoheng Deng, KenLi Li, Zhi-Gang Chen

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2013.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

synchronous modetit for tatupdating ruleswin-stay, lose-shift

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Memory mechanism with weighting promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games ⋮ Impacts of memory on a regular lattice for different population sizes with asynchronous update in spatial snowdrift game ⋮ Effects of taxation on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas ⋮ Robustness of cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice

Cites Work

• Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION
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