Do not aim too high nor too low: moderate expectation-based group formation promotes public cooperation on networks

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2014.05.048zbMath1402.91067OpenAlexW2071361856MaRDI QIDQ1782973

Te Wu, Xiao-Feng Wang, Long Wang

Publication date: 20 September 2018

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2014.05.048

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorypublic goods game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of synergistic and discounted group interactions in structured populations ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game ⋮ Individual choice and reputation distribution of cooperative behaviors among heterogeneous groups ⋮ Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization

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• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment

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