Reserve prices in auctions with entry when the seller is risk-averse

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.02.006zbMath1396.91273OpenAlexW2586679744MaRDI QIDQ1783447

Diego Moreno, John Wooders

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25137

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionsecond-price auctionsendogenous entrypublic and secret reserve prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Auctions with entry
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

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