Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024zbMath1396.91241OpenAlexW2589988959MaRDI QIDQ1783457

Hu Fu, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170518-080939719

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingsimultaneous single-item auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Principal-agent VCG contracts

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job security, stability, and production efficiency
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

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