Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.033zbMath1396.91127OpenAlexW2592487726MaRDI QIDQ1783470

Boris D. Ginzburg

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25171

zbMATH Keywords

informationvotingconflicting preferencesfractionalisation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (1)

Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting

Cites Work

• Sincere voting in large elections
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
• How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
• Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation
• Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg

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