Evolutionary dynamics of collective action when individual fitness derives from group decisions taken in the past

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.12.027zbMath1397.91073OpenAlexW1973624952WikidataQ39664451 ScholiaQ39664451MaRDI QIDQ1784015

G. Richomme

Publication date: 26 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.12.027

zbMATH Keywords

delay differential equationsevolutionary game theorypublic goods games\(n\)-person stag hunt gameevolution of collective action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Three-player games with strategy-dependent time delays ⋮ Collective behavior and evolutionary games -- an introduction ⋮ Replicator dynamics of evolutionary games with different delays on costs and benefits ⋮ Discrete and continuous distributed delays in replicator dynamics ⋮ Replicator dynamics of an \(N\)--player snowdrift game with delayed payoffs ⋮ Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Delay differential equations: with applications in population dynamics
• Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games
• The trade-off between mutual interference and time lags in predator-prey systems
• Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
• Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamics with time delay

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics of collective action when individual fitness derives from group decisions taken in the past