Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
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Publication:1784222
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.011zbMath1397.91076OpenAlexW2149719236WikidataQ39661356 ScholiaQ39661356MaRDI QIDQ1784222
Martin A. Nowak, David G. Rand
Publication date: 26 September 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.011
Related Items (11)
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics resolve the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Evolutionary game analysis of cooperation between microgrid and conventional grid ⋮ General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection ⋮ Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust ⋮ Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games ⋮ Stochastic dynamics in the fitness-based process which can be on behalf of the standard Moran, local and Wright-Fisher processes ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions ⋮ A random world is a fair world ⋮ Evolution of fairness in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
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