Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.02.021zbMath1397.91062OpenAlexW2085560336WikidataQ41824141 ScholiaQ41824141MaRDI QIDQ1784331

Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A. Nowak, Damien Zufferey

Publication date: 26 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc3322297

zbMATH Keywords

learning theoryevolutionary game theorydirect reciprocity (prisoner's dilemma)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict ⋮ Heterogeneity in background fitness acts as a suppressor of selection ⋮ Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint ⋮ Reflective Evolution Under Strategic Uncertainty ⋮ Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Competitive exclusion and coexistence of universal grammars
• On the stabilizing effect of predators and competitors on ecological communities
• Optimizing the mutual intelligibility of linguistic agents in a shared world
• Assortative mating, selection and mutation models for continuous variation: A reply to Felsenstein
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Eavesdropping and language dynamics
• Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
• Replicator-mutator equation, universality property and population dynamics of learning
• Learning in games with unstable equilibria
• Game dynamics with learning and evolution of universal grammar
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
• Evolution of Universal Grammar
• A theory of the learnable
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Language identification in the limit
• The Calculus of Selfishness
• Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games