Complete attack on RLWE key exchange with reused keys, without signal leakage
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Publication:1784478
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_27zbMath1444.94063OpenAlexW2795139011MaRDI QIDQ1784478
Saraswathy Rv, Jintai Ding, Scott Fluhrer
Publication date: 26 September 2018
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_27
Related Items (8)
Towards post-quantum security for signal's X3DH handshake ⋮ Improved attacks against key reuse in learning with errors key exchange ⋮ Small leaks sink a great ship: an evaluation of key reuse resilience of PQC third round finalist NTRU-HRSS ⋮ A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs ⋮ A one-time single-bit fault leaks all previous NTRU-HRSS session keys to a chosen-ciphertext attack ⋮ Revisiting security estimation for LWE with hints from a geometric perspective ⋮ Recovery attack on Bob's reused randomness in CRYSTALS-KYBER and SABER ⋮ On removing rejection conditions in practical lattice-based signatures
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