Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2015.03.006zbMath1408.91036OpenAlexW1990510937MaRDI QIDQ1785361

António Osório

Publication date: 28 September 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/249233

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamespublic monitoringfrequent monitoringinformation characteristics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Information can wreck cooperation: a counterpoint to Kandori (1992)
• Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
• A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise
• Reputation in Continuous-Time Games
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Frequent Signals^*

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