When an inefficient competitor makes higher profit than its efficient rival

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2015.01.002zbMath1408.91151OpenAlexW2052903147MaRDI QIDQ1785628

Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Debapriya Sen

Publication date: 1 October 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59639/8/MPRA_paper_59639.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot duopolystrategic delegationanticoordination gamesprofit incentiverevenue incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry ⋮ Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry revised ⋮ Strategic delegation in a differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs

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