Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.007zbMath1408.91021OpenAlexW2292152807MaRDI QIDQ1785749

R. K. Amit, Rajeev R. Tripathi

Publication date: 1 October 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalitional gamespartition function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• A recursive core for partition function form games
• The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• N‐person games in partition function form

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