Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.005zbMath1397.91544OpenAlexW2140086022WikidataQ57663946 ScholiaQ57663946MaRDI QIDQ1786385

Nikolaus Ritt, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date: 24 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

language evolutionevolutionary language gameneutrally stable polymorphismsshifting balance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linguistics (91F20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Non trivial coexistence conditions for a model of language competition obtained by bifurcation theory

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