Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.07.031zbMath1397.91059OpenAlexW2111721686WikidataQ39708967 ScholiaQ39708967MaRDI QIDQ1786532

Jean-Baptiste André, Nicolas Baumard

Publication date: 24 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.031

zbMATH Keywords

ultimatum gameevolution of cooperationoutside optionspartner switchingmoral psychology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (10)

Partner choice promotes cooperation: the two faces of testing with agent-based models ⋮ Effects of game willingness on the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game ⋮ Coevolution of spatial ultimatum game and link weight promotes fairness ⋮ Pinning control of social fairness in the ultimatum game ⋮ A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution ⋮ Modelling the emergence of an egalitarian society in the \(n\)-player game framework ⋮ Coevolution of fairness and spite on stochastic dynamics networks ⋮ Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information ⋮ Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm ⋮ Generosity, selfishness and exploitation as optimal greedy strategies for resource sharing

Cites Work

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• Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers
• Optimal foraging, the marginal value theorem
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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