Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2018.06.011zbMath1418.91220OpenAlexW2963304972WikidataQ129654279 ScholiaQ129654279MaRDI QIDQ1786603

Paolo Serafino, Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 24 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a6fc74a8-8f4f-4f67-a0d0-09f13c93d0dd

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designexternalitiessponsored search auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
• New Inapproximability Bounds for TSP
• Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search
• Color-coding
• Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions
• Adopting the Cascade Model in Ad Auctions: Efficiency Bounds and Truthful Algorithmic Mechanisms
• Automata, Languages and Programming

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