Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization

DOI10.1016/j.physleta.2018.04.031zbMath1398.91080OpenAlexW2799346394WikidataQ129957737 ScholiaQ129957737MaRDI QIDQ1786715

Xiukang Yang, Ji Quan, Xian-Jia Wang

Publication date: 24 September 2018

Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2018.04.031

zbMATH Keywords

particle swarm optimizationpublic goods gamepeer punishmentself-punishmentthe evolution of cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (15)

Evidential reasoning based on imitation and aspiration information in strategy learning promotes cooperation in optional spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism ⋮ Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Rational conformity behavior in social learning promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism ⋮ Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Stochastically stable equilibria in the nonlinear public goods game ⋮ Dynamic scale return coefficient with environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Particle swarm intelligence and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with punishment ⋮ The roles of particle swarm intelligence in the prisoner's dilemma based on continuous and mixed strategy systems on scale-free networks ⋮ Information fusion based on reputation and payoff promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games ⋮ Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games ⋮ How to evaluate one's behavior toward ‘bad’ individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games ⋮ Reputation-based conditional compassion promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games

Cites Work

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• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
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