Joint search with no information: an immediate agreement theorem

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.08.026zbMath1396.91078OpenAlexW2752456862MaRDI QIDQ1786738

Rohan Dutta

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.026

zbMATH Keywords

committeesbargainingsearchsecretary problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Search theory (90B40) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
• A sequential selection game with vetoes
• Optimal stopping problems by two or more decision makers: a survey
• Search by committee
• Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution
• A non-zero-sum no-information best-choice game
• Specialization and partisanship in committee search
• Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

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