The spite motive in third price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.028zbMath1396.91270OpenAlexW2759015997MaRDI QIDQ1786773

Wladislaw Mill

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.028

zbMATH Keywords

auctionoverbiddingspiteanticipated regret

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation

Cites Work

• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
• \(k\)-price auctions
• Voluntary participation and spite in public good provision experiments: An international comparison
• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information

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