A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.036zbMath1398.91101OpenAlexW2607543930MaRDI QIDQ1786781

Cheng Li

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.036

zbMATH Keywords

monetary transfersBayesian persuasionsignal informativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Paying with information ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality

Cites Work

• Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions

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