Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.039zbMath1398.91105OpenAlexW2761447073MaRDI QIDQ1786784

Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner

Publication date: 25 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58046/1/32.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevelation principleex-post constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities ⋮ Optimal contingent delegation

Cites Work

• Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle
• Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
• On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

This page was built for publication: Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints